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Pension Systems for Public Sector Employees in the Republic of Korea 
 
<Abstract>   
 
On December 31, 2009, the Government Employees Pension System (GEPS) in the 
Republic of Korea was faced with a huge pension reform. The objective of the reform was 
to lessen the financial burden in the future. This paper tries to provide a comprehensive 
understanding on the 2009 reform, rationalizing on the resulting effects, its limitation and 
tasks ahead. Initially, upon the preliminary comments on the structure of public pension 
system  in  Korea, the  paper  presents  the  history  and  design  features  of  the  pension 
schemes for public sector employees. Second, it provides detailed aspects of the reform 
such as key issues, reform process and resulting pension structure. Then, as a primary 
concern,  it  examines  the  effects  of  the  2009  reform  from  two  different  perspectives; 
financial  evaluation  in  macro  perspective  and  individual  equity  evaluation  in  micro 
perspective. Finally, we will try to evaluate the 2009 reform of the GEPS as a whole, and 
then to address its limitation and tasks ahead. We show that, while the 2009 reform could 
consolidate the financial status for the scheme by and large, the GEPS will inevitably face 
various challenges ahead. The implication is that future path of the reform should be 
chosen in a fashion that both macro-financial aspect and micro-equity aspect are equally 
well considered. 
 
Keywords: Government Employees Pension System (GEPS), Military Pension System 
(MPS), pension reform, financial status, individual equity   3 
1.  Introduction
1   
 
The Government Employees Pension System (GEPS) in the Republic of Korea was 
implemented  in  1960,  as  a  personnel  vehicle  to  recruit,  retain,  motivate  and  ensure  a 
competitive and vigorous working force. Under this context, the benefit level of the GEPS 
remained relatively generous as a way to compensate for the low wage and unfavorable 
working conditions of government employees during their service, which has indeed served 
as  a  significant  incentive  to  attract  competent  workforce  and  encourage  a  long-term 
working commitment to the public service.   
The financial situation of the GEPS had been relatively stable for the first thirty five 
years since its inception but, from the late 1990s, as the system matured, it began to run 
into financial difficulties. At the root of the turmoil were a number of factors, including 1) 
generous contribution-benefit structure, 2) aging public sector; 3) growing life expectancy 
and 4) large-scale layoffs during the Asian economic crisis (1997~1999). In order to deal 
with the ensuing challenges, the system was to be re-designed in some way or another. In 
response, the government set out a series of reform process beginning in the mid-1990s 
(1995,  2000)  and  the  recent  amendment  was  implemented  on  December  31,  2009. 
However, the road ahead for the GEPS still does not look easy, because the number of 
retirees is likely to increase as the system matures and the pension coverage periods will be 
lengthened continuously as the average lifespan increases. This would result in a sharp rise 
in  the  pension  expenditure,  which  would  be  a  considerable  burden  on  the  future 
government. 
The main aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the 2009 
reform, rationalizing the resulting effects, its limitation and tasks ahead. Initially, upon the 
preliminary comments on the structure of public pension system in Korea, we describe 
the  history  and  design  features  of  the  pension  schemes  that  apply  to  government 
employees and military personnel of Korea. Second, we provide detailed aspects of the 
2009 reform such as key issues, reform process and resulting pension structure. Then, as a 
primary  concern,  we  examine  the  effects  of  the  2009  reform  from  two  different 
perspectives; financial evaluation in macro perspective and individual equity evaluation in 
micro perspective. That is, we pay particular attention to both the long-term financial 
condition of the GEPS and the various aspects of generational equity. Finally, we will try 
to evaluate the 2009 reform of the GEPS as a whole, and then to address its limitation and 
tasks ahead. As an important simulation result, we show that, while the 2009 reform could 
                                            
1  We thank Dr. Jai Seop Lee, Dr. In Bo Song and Seung Seob Song for their reviews on various stages of this 
research. All opinions expressed here are strictly those of the authors and are not necessarily those of Korea 
Development Institute (KDI) and the GEPS Research Institute.     4 
consolidate the financial status for the scheme by and large, the GEPS will inevitably face 
various challenges ahead. The implication is that future path of the reform should be 
chosen in a fashion that both macro-financial aspect and micro-equity aspect are equally 
well considered.   
 
2.  The  Evolution  and  Design  Features  of  the  Government  Employees  and 
Military Pension Systems 
 
The Structure of Public Pension System in Korea   
Following  Kwon  and  Kwak  (2006),  the  typical  structure  of  public  pension  system 
comprises of the following three types;   
․  the same pension system for public and private sectors   
․  separated public sector and private sector pension system
2 
․  integrated pension schemes for public and private sectors but with separate top up pension system    
The first, a single-tier unified structure, can be found in Hungary and Poland. The 
second, a single-tier separated structure, can be found in France, Germany, Finland and 
Austria. This structure varies in that, while the system in France and Germany is separate 
with more generous benefits compared with the private sector, the system in Finland and 
Austria
3  is separate with almost the same benefits. The thir d, a two-tier, partly separated 
structure, can be found in Denmark, Norway, Japan and Sweden.  This type provides a 
mandatory national basic scheme with different top -up pension systems and in this case, 
the national scheme tends to be a 'guarantee pension'. 
The structure of Korean public pension system belongs to the second type , as shown 
in Figure 1. While public employees (including public school teachers), military  members 
and private school teachers have their own occupational pension systems (GEPS, Military 
Pension System, Private School Teachers Pension System, respectively), the general public 
participate in the National Pension System (NPS) (see Table 1 for more details). The three 
occupational pension systems have almost the same benefit structure being more generous 
than the National Pension. 
                                            
2  Over half of the countries in the world operate a separate civil servant pension system (Song 2010). 
3  In Austria, with effect from 2005, there has been harmonization of public sector and private sector pension 
systems but with transition arrangement. See OECD (2005) for more details.   5 
[Figure 1] Structure of Public Pension System in Korea   
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Source: Song (2010) 
 
<Table 1> Overview of Public Pension System in Korea, 2009   
Category 
















year of inception  1960  1963  1975  1988 
coverage 
government 








(18 ~ 60 years of age),   
* except for the coverage 
of occupational pensions 
  active participants 
(in thousand) 
1,050  176  262  18,720 
pensioners 
(in thousand) 
293  77  28  2,560 
 
The Evolution of the Public Employees Pension System 
The  Government  Employees  Pension  Act  (GEPA)  was  passed  in  1959  and  the 
Government Employees Pension System (GEPS), as the first public pension in Korea
4, 
was implemented in January 1, 1960,  primarily as a personnel vehicle to recruit , retain, 
motivate and ensure a competitive and vigorous working force. That is, the GEPS started 
as a career-based pension system in which pension benefits should be considered as extended 
earnings rather than deferred earnings.
5  The GEPS has been modified several times during the 
                                            
4  Civil servant and military personnel in most countries were among the first occupational groups to obtain 
pension benefits (Gillion et al. 2000, OECD 2005, Song 2010). 
5  Currently, the career-based system is under pressure in changing socio-economic circumstances because it 
runs against trends in the wider job market. However, there is little evidence that OECD countries with 
traditional career-based system tend to abandon them altogether (Song 2010, OECD 2004).   6 
last fifty years. The early scheme covered military members in addition to government 
employees and public school teachers. But, in 1963, military members have been separated 
and removed to the Military Pension System (MPS). The initial contribution rate was 4.6 
percent of basic salary, shared equally by the government and employee, and it stood at 17 
percent in 2009. The minimum retirement age (MRA) was initially set at 60 in 1960 and 
then abolished in 1962, providing immediate pension benefits to all retirees. In 1996, it 
was set at 60 again. The maximum level of income replacement rate for 33 years of service 
was 70 percent of final basic salary in the initial stage and was increased to 75 percent 
(1980)  and  subsequently  to  76  percent  of  final  three  years  basic  salary  until the  2009 
reform took place.   
However, an early sign of financial difficulty surfaced in 1995 when it ran into deficit 
for the first time in its history. This is mainly due to demographic aging and generous 
benefits  structure.  The  strain  was  further  aggravated  in  1998  when  large-scale  layoffs 
occurred  during  the  Asian  economic  crisis  (1997~1999).  The  deficit  amounted  to  1.7 
trillion won (35% of total pension expenditure) in 1998, 2.7 trillion won (38% of total 
expenditure) in 1999, and 1.8 trillion won (22% of total pension expenditure) in 2000.
6 
Faced with serious financial instability, the government conducted a parametric reform in 
2000, implementing a new system on January 1, 2001.
7   
 
The Features of the Public Employees Pension System before the 2009 Reform 
The  major  benefits  of  the  GEPS  are  retirement  pension  benefits  and  survivors’ 
pension benefits, determined by DB formula. The accrual rate is 2.5 percent of final three 
years average basic salary for the first 20 years of service and 2 percent for each additional 
year. At least 20 years of service entitles the eligibility of pension benefits. The maximum 
service year and replacement rate of retirement benefits are respectively 33 years and 76 
percent.  The  minimum  retirement  age (MRA)  was  set  at  60 or  at  the time  of  normal 
retirement
8  (See Table 4 for more details). The reduced benefit is provided with 5 percent 
reduction for each year up to 5 years. The survivors’ pension benefits are 70 percent of the 
retirement pension benefits. The system is financed by contributions from employees and 
the government (respectively 8.5 percent of basic salary). In addition, whenever pension 
deficit occurs, it is to be subsidized by the government's general budget. That is, since the 
2000 reform, the GEPS has begun to operate on a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) basis, only 
with a small sum of contingency fund. The Ministry of Public Administration and Security 
                                            
6  The GEPS failed to meet its payment obligation in 2000 and had to borrow about 1 trillion won from the 
government. 
7  See Song (2010) for more details of the reform. 
8  It varies with types of employee, ranging from age 50 (security guard) to age 65 (professor).   7 
(MOPAS)  supervises  the  GEPS  in  overall  and  the  Government  Employees  Pension 
Service  (GEPSRV) handles  the  administrative  function of the  GEPS  and manages the 
contingency fund. As shown in Table 2, at the end of 2009, the GEPS is comprised of 
1,047,897 active participants and 289,996 pensioners. In 2009, total expenditure paid was 
6.75 trillion won and total income received was 4.84 trillion won. Consequently, the annual 
deficit was 1.90 trillion won (see Box below for design features of the Military Pension 
System). 
 
<Table 2> Demographic and Financial Status of the GEPS 


















1990  843,262  25,121  3.0%  797.3  723.6  73.7 
1994  948,151  47,622  5.0%  1,752.0  1,935.1  △183.1 
1998  952,154  88,723  9.3%  3,316.4  5,069.8  △1,753.4 
2002  930,835  168,506  18.1%  3,429.6  3,052.0  377.6 
2006  1,009,145  233,737  23.2%  4,407.6  5,055.3  △647.7 
2008  1,030,256  276,829  26.9%  4,860.5  6,289.9  △1,429.4 
2009  1,047,897  289,996  27.8%  4,843.9  6,746.7  △1,902.8 
Source: The GEPS Statistical Yearbook (2009) 
 
  Box: Military Pension System (MPS) 
As part of an integrated pay, benefits and allowance system, the MPS is implemented in 1963 to 
recruit, retain, motivate and ensure a young and vigorous active-duty force. Prior to 1963, the 
military members were covered under the GEPS. The structure of the plan was exactly the 
same as one for GEPS until the 2009 reform took place, except that the system provided an 
immediate benefit with no minimum age limitation (see Table 4 for more details). The system is 
financed by contributions from the military members and the government (8.5% of basic salary, 
respectively).  In  addition,  whenever  pension  deficit  occurs,  it  is  to  be  subsidized  by  the 
government's general budget. The MPS operates on a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) basis only with 
a small sum of contingency fund and is administered by the Ministry of Defense (MOD). At 
the end of 2009, the MPS is comprised of 166,269 active participants and 72,905 pensioners. In 
2009, total expenditure paid was 2.06 trillion won and total income received was 1.12 trillion 
won.  Consequently,  the  annual  deficit was 0.94  trillion  won.  Beginning 2011,  the  MOD is 
drafting  a  pension  proposal  in  which  employee  contribution is  raised  to  approximately 11 
percent.     8 
Long-term  Financial  Status  of  the  Government  Employees  Pension  System 
before the 2009 Reform   
As shown in Table 3, Table 4 and Figure 2, it turns out that, even with the 2000 reform, 
the  financial  status  of  the  GEPS  is  still  far  from  being  sound.  In  our  projection,  a 
dependency  ratio,  expressed  as  the  ratio  of  the  number  of  pensioners  relative  to  the 
number of active members, will rise from 30.7 in 2011, 108.2 in 2070 sixty years after with 
a  growth  rate  of  273  percent.  This  rise  reflects  a  rapid  aging  of  the  population  and 
generous benefits structure. That is, the annual deficits of expenditure over income are 
expected to rise exponentially, emanating from structural imbalance between benefits and 
contribution in addition to population aging. A deficit (or subsidy) rate, expressed as the 
ratio of pension deficit relative to payroll, is projected to rise from 6.3 percent in 2011 to 
36.0 percent in 2070. The long-term GEPS actuarial deficit implies that the government 
should eventually subsidize more than one third of the payroll for the pension cost in 
addition to the regular contribution. Under such conditions, not a few began to worry that 
the burden might exceed the affordable range of the government budget and some voices 
were being raised over the need to improve the system’s financial soundness. 
 
<Table 3> Financial Prospect of the GEPS before the 2009 Reform   
(As of January 2010, Won in billions) 






2011  5,350.1  7,858.7  2,508.6 
2015  6,155.0  11,682.4  5,527.4 
2020  7,411.4  17,379.5  9,968.1 
2030  10,185.9  33,596.2  23,410.3 
2040  14,083.0  53,028.6  38,945.6 
2050  18,447.6  73,067.0  54,619.4 
2060  22,992.7  98,624.9  75,632.2 
2070  29,513.7  124,747.8  95,234.1 
     9 
<Table 4> Demographic and Financial Prospects of the GEPS before the 2009 Reform 
  (As of January, 2010)   








2011  30.67  10.86%  17.16%  6.30% 
2015  38.86  10.64%  20.99%  10.35% 
2020  50.21  10.80%  25.59%  14.79% 
2030  71.23  11.05%  35.71%  24.66% 
2040  88.12  11.39%  41.38%  29.99% 
2050  99.35  11.52%  43.80%  32.28% 
2060  106.35  11.41%  47.42%  36.01% 
2070  108.18  11.46%  47.47%  36.02% 
Note:  Dependency  Ratio:  no.  of  pensioners/no.  of  participants,  Income  Rate:  revenue/gross 
payroll, Cost Rate: expenditure/gross payroll, Deficit Rate: deficit/gross payroll 
 
[Figure 2] Demographic and Financial Prospects of the GEPS before the 2009 Reform 
 
 
3. The 2009 Reform of the Government Employees Pension System   
 
Key Issues   
During the reform process, there were a number of - sometimes competing - issues 
that  drove  decisions  about  what  changes  should  be  made  to  the  GEPS.  First,  fiscal 
pressure was clearly the major driver of the reform. Indeed, there was the obvious goal of 
making  the  system  financially  sound  so  that  it  would  be  structurally  sustainable.  In 
addition,  the  government  began  to  look  at  the  financial  issue  not  from  a  singular 
programmatic  perspective  but  from  an  overall  budgetary  perspective.  In  2009,  the   10 
government spent 4.4 percent of payroll for the deficit but this number will continue to 
grow to 36 percent in the long-term, which would be a considerable burden on the future 
government.   
Second, the pension system was still expected to provide an adequate level of benefits. 
Most public employees considered that it is reasonable for the government to guarantee 
any public employees that have served over certain amount of time in public service with 
an  adequate  income  security  in retirement. There  may be  a  certain  room  for benefits 
reduction, but the benefits should be reduced only in a fashion that their income security 
in retirement is to be well-protected. Moreover, the government had a rationale to provide 
adequate  level  of  pension  benefits  in  order  to  recruit,  retain,  motivate  and  ensure  a 
competitive and vigorous working force. 
Third, after the 2007 reform of National Pension
9, there was a considerable demand to 
adjust pension systems between the public and private se ctors so that they are more 
compatible.  For instance, there was an uncomfortable issue of whether the general 
taxpayer (including low-income worker) should pay for the generous benefits of the GEPS. 
This pressure would inevitably reduce the pension benefits of the GEPS and consequently 
the pension  gap  between the  public and private sectors. However, the harmonization 
process turned out to complicate the management of the systems as a career -based 
compensation package and the determination of benefits because of the coexistence of 
different formulae. Also, the difference in lifetime earnings between the public and private 
sectors would have a significant impact on the process
10.   
 
Reform Process (2006~2009)   
Although  the  reform  options  are  relatively  well  understood,  the  choices  would  be 
extremely difficult, because its growth in cost can be contained only with sacrificing the 
benefits.  In  May  2006,  the  Korean  government  (MOPAS)  commissioned  Korea 
Development  Institute  (KDI,  hereafter)  to  draft  a  reform  proposal  for  the  fiscal 
stabilization and system improvement of the GEPS and, later that year in October, KDI 
presented its reform measures for the pension to the MOPAS. KDI suggested a structural 
reform of transforming the current single-tiered system into a multi-tiered system. (See 
Appendix for more details). In July 2006, the government set up a Committee for the 
Development of the GEPS (the Committee, hereafter), composed of various policy stake-
holders  ranging  from  public  officials  to  university  professors,  union  members  and 
                                            
9  The scale of the 2007 NPS reform was significant in that the level of old-age pension was to be cut by a 
third (from 60 percent to 40 percent for the contributor of 40 years) without any significant resistance from 
interest groups or the other political actors (Song 2010). 
10  OECD(2005)   11 
pensioners. Based on KDI’s proposals, the Committee had discussed on a conceptual 
framework  of  the pension  reform, having  11  plenary meetings  and  16  sub-committee 
meetings over the period from July 2006 to April 2007. In April 2007, the Committee 
presented its reform proposal to the government (MOPAS). The committee proposed a 
reform which was to convert the one-tier DB system into multi-tier system; a DB basic 
pension system will be directly linked to the National Pension System, and an additional 
occupational  pension  system  to  be  newly  introduced.  The  latter,  again,  would  be  a 
combination of DB component and a voluntary DC component (See Figure 3 below)
11. 
 
[Figure 3] Conceptual Framework of Reform Proposal in 2007 
 
Source: Moon (2008) 
 
  However, the proposal failed to meet the wide range of competing expectations. The 
union  members  did  not  like  the  proposal  because  it  would  inappropriately  raise  the 
contribution  rate  and  cut  the  level  of  benefits.  Most  of  the  pension  experts  did  not 
support  the  proposal  because  it  did  not  reduce  the  level  of  benefits  enough.  The 
government,  in  particular,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  Economy,  did  not  accept  the 
proposal  because,  upon  the  introduction  of  the  DC  plan,  the  financial  burden  rather 
increased in the near future.
12   
In July 2007, the Committee re-convened for the second term and, upon learning that 
the  consensus of  the union members and pensioners was almost a  prerequisite for a 
successful reform, the larger inclusion of union members were made; from two members 
                                            
11  Moon (2008) 
12  This is mainly because the introduction of the DC component plan requires higher contribution of the 
government right after the re form. The DC component tends to increase  the government burden in  the 
short-range but with the eventual decrease (Kim, Choi, Kim, and Huang 2008).   12 
in the previous stage to five.
13  After the deliberation of a full year, in September 2008, the 
Committee submitted its second report to the government. Sinc e this proposal was 
intended to be a compromise among various interest groups, a final version of reform bill 
was made with no virtual modification and submitted into the National Assembly on the 
same month. After the deliberation of another full year in t he Assembly, the reform bill 
was finally passed on  December 31, 2009. It took almost four  long years to finalize the 
compromised version of the pension reform.
14  In overall, it is very singular that, while the 
previous reforms were un-exceptionally government-driven, the 2009 pension reform was 
rather committee-driven with the participation of a wide range of stakeholders.   
 
The Structure of the Government Employees Pension System after the Reform   
Instead  of  structural  change  suggested  at the  initial  stage,  the  finalized  reform  was 
based on the parametric change, shifting income base from a standardized basic salary to a 
taxable gross wage
15, raising the contribution rate from 5.52 5 percent
16  of taxable gross 
wage to 7.0 percent and reducing the annual rate from 2.1  percent
17  of career average 
gross wage to 1.9 percent. As the most important element, the minimum  retirement age 
was set at dual basis; for the incumbent the previous term (age 60 or at the time of normal 
retirement
18) was maintained while for the newly appointed  it was set at age 65. To this 
end, the pension structure for the new appointed became very similar to the National 
Pension's, except for the contribution rate (7.0  percent vs. 4.5 percent) and accrual rate 
(1.9 percent vs. 1.0 percent). The major elements of the 2009 reform consist of;   
․  changing the income base from a standardized basic salary to a taxable gross wage 
․  extending pensionable wage from final 3 years average to career average   
․  raising contribution rate from 5.525% of taxable gross wage to 7%   
․  shifting pension indexation into price index 
․  applying the ceiling of pension benefits and income base for contribution as the 1.8 times of average 
wage for all members   
․  applying the minimum eligibility age to 65 (for the newly ensured only)   
                                            
13  The underlying reason for including more union member was to make a compromise with the unions at 
the stage rather than through direct political confrontation after the Committee made decisions (Kwon 2009). 
14  See Song (2010) and Kwon (2009) for more detailed description of the 2009 reform process. 
15  It is known that, in average, government employee’s basic salary is approximately 65 percent of his taxable 
gross wage. That is, the ratio of the standardized basic salary to the taxable gross wage is known to be 65. 
16  Note that 5.525 percent of taxable gross wage is equivalent to 8.5 percent of basic salary. 
17  For 33 years of service, average accrual rate in the absence of the reform is 2.1 percent of career average 
gross wage. Note that the accrual rate in the absence of the reform is 2.5 percent of final three years average 
basic salary for the first 20 years of service and 2 percent for each additional year. 
18  It varies with types of employee, ranging from age 50 (security guard) to age 65 (professor).   13 
․  reducing the level of the Survivors’ Pension Benefits from 70% of the Retirement Pension Benefits 
to 60% (for the newly ensured only) 
 
<Table 5> Benefits Structure of the GEPS after the 2009 Reform     
Category  Before the Reform  After the Reform 
income base 
basic salary (BS) 
65% of gross wage 
 
gross wage (GW) 
* ceiling:: 1.8 times of average wage for all 
members 
benefit formula of retirement 
benefits 
(2%* n)+10% 
* n: years of service  1.9%× n 
maximum years of contribution   33 years  33 years 
contribution rate  8.5% of basic salary  6.0% (‘09)→  6.3%(’10) →  6.7%(’11)  →  7.0% (‘12) 
pension base  final-3 year average basic salary  career  average gross wage 
minimum retirement age  60 or at the time of normal retirement 
CE  60 
NE  65 
cost-of-living increases  CPI + Wage Index 
* mixed adjustment 
CPI (in transition) 
* completely CPI from 2019 
minimum service years  2 0   20 
lump-sum alternatives  yes  yes 
survivors’ pension  70%  of retirement pension   CE  70% 
NE  60% 
non-job related disability pension  no  no 
survivors’ pension (n< 10 years)  no  no 
Note: CE for the incumbent, NE for the newly appointed 
 
4. Evaluation on the 2009 GEPS Reform 
 
Financial Evaluation: Macro-perspective   
In  order  to  evaluate  the  financial  status  of  the  GEPS;  we  apply  several  types  of 
demographic  and  financial  measures  such  as  dependency  ratio  and  annual  cash-flow 
measures, including income rate, cost rate and deficit (subsidy) rate. The dependency ratio, 
as  demographic  measure,  is  defined  as  the  ratio  of  the  number  of  pensioners  to  the 
number of  active  participants.  The  annual  income  rate  and  cost  rate  are  expressed  as 
percentage of revenue and expenditure relative to the taxable payroll, respectively. The 
annual deficit rate is expressed as the difference between the cost rate and the income rate. 
The dependency ratio and the deficit rate are critically important in assessing the financial 
condition of the program for the very long range. Table 6, Table 7 and Figure 4 provide 
estimates of the demographic and financial effects of the GEPS for the 2009 reform.     14 
The estimated dependency ratio of the GEPS is expected to rise rapidly between 2010 
and 2040. As compared to the 2010 level of 29 beneficiaries per 100 ensured workers, the 
ratio is estimated to rise 50.35 by 2020, 71.37 by 2030 and 86.36 by 2040. This is primarily 
due to both the large retirement of working population and their prolonged life-span. 
Here, the large retirement of working population occur mainly because of the swings in 
population structure. Since aging population would take several decades, the number of 
retirees is expected to increase rapidly in the future. However, after 2040, this trend will 
slow  down  as  only  the  increasing  longevity  takes  effect,  reaching  95.17  by  2070.  As 
compared to the levels before the reform, the dependency ratio falls only after the 2040s. 
This is because the reform would have a deterring effect on the retirement only when the 
newly appointed with the MRA of 65 begin to retire. 
 
<Table 6> Financial Prospects of the GEPS after the 2009 Reform 
(As of January 2010, Won in billions) 
Year 



















2011  5,350.1  6,427.7  1,077.6  7,858.7  7,603.0  -255.0  2,508.6  1,175.3  -1,333.3 
2015  6,155.0  7,774.7  1,619.7  11,682.4  11,380.9  -301.5  5,527.4  3,606.2  -1,921.2 
2020  7,411.4  9,373.4  1,962.0  17,379.5  17,018.5  -361.0  9,968.1  7,645.1  -2,323.0 
2030  10,185.9  12,888.2  2,702.3  33,596.2  31,526.5  -2,069.7  23,410.3  18,638.3  -4,772.0 
2040  14,083.0  17,822.6  3,739.6  53,028.6  45,653.6  -7,375.0  38,945.6  27,831.0  -11,114.6 
2050  18,447.6  23,348.9  4,901.3  73,067.0  53,325.5  -19,741.5  54,619.4  29,976.6  -24,642.8 
2060  22,992.7  29,103.9  6,111.2  98,624.9  70,688.4  -27,936.5  75,632.2  41,584.5  -34,047.7 
2070  29,513.7  37,361.9  7,848.2  124,747.8  92,750.8  -31,997.0  95,234.1  55,388.9  -39,845.2 
 
<Table 7> Demographic and Financial Prospects of the GEPS after the 2009 Reform 
(As of January, 2010)   








2011  30.71  13.05%  17.05%  4.00% 
2015  38.95  13.44%  20.60%  7.16% 
2020  50.35  13.66%  25.08%  11.42% 
2030  71.37  13.98%  33.41%  19.43% 
2040  86.36  14.42%  35.11%  20.70% 
2050  86.20  14.59%  30.46%  15.87% 
2060  91.42  14.45%  31.46%  17.01% 
2070  95.17  14.50%  32.23%  17.72% 
Note:  Dependency  Ratio:  no.  of  pensioners/no.  of  participants,  Income  Rate:  revenue/gross 
payroll, Cost Rate: expenditure/gross payroll, Deficit Rate: deficit/gross payroll   15 
[Figure 4] Demographic and Financial Prospects of the GEPS after the 2009 Reform   
 
 
Basic  to  the  consideration  of  the  long-range  actuarial  status  of  the  GEPS  are  the 
concepts of income rate and cost rate. Table 7 shows that the income rate stays almost the 
same over time and reaches 14.50 percent of taxable payroll for 2070. As compared to the 
level  before  the  reform, the  income  rate  rises  with  the  same magnitude  of change  in 
contribution rate. The pattern of the cost rate is much different. From 2010 to about 2040, 
the cost rate rises rapidly as the retirement of the aging population causes the number of 
beneficiaries to rise much faster than the working population. After 2040, the cost rate 
remains fairly stable because the number of workers and beneficiaries are projected to 
change at the same rate. The cost rate reaches 31.98 percent of taxable payroll for 2070. 
As compared to the level before the reform, the cost rate sharply falls between 2040 and 
2070.   
The pattern of the projected GEPS deficit (subsidy) rate is important in the evaluation 
of the financial condition of the plan. As shown in Table 7 and Figure 4, it turns out that 
the annual balance is in deficit with two different stages. From 2010 and 2030, the annual 
deficit rises rapidly, reaching 19.43 percent of payroll by 2030. This is because of the aging 
population and its resulting massive  retirement. Thereafter, the trend slows down and 
stabilizes to 17.72 percent by 2070. This is because, although the increasing longevity still 
takes effect, the unit cost of retirees significantly goes down. As compared to the level 
before the reform, the deficit (subsidy) rate is expected to fall in two stages. At the first 
stage, between 2010 and 2030, the magnitude of the fall is relatively minimal because only 
the  change  of  contribution  may  have  an  effect  on  the  balance.  At  the  second  stage, 
between 2030 and 2070, the magnitude of the fall sharply increases because the reform 
would have a decisive effect on the balance as the newly appointed with the MRA of 65 
begin to retire. For 2070, the deficit (subsidy) rate would be reduced from over 36 percent 
to less than 18 percent. Overall, the 2009 reform would eventually reduce the burden of 
the future government by more than 50 percent, implying that the financing of the future   16 
GEPS  would  be  improved  more  than  ever  before.  However,  the  significance  of  the 
financial improvement must be kept in proper perspective. It should be noted that the 
financial gain until 2030 turns out to be relatively small and the future government most 
likely still has to subsidize approximately one fifth of the payroll for the pension.   
 
Individual Equity Evaluation: Micro-perspective   
Here, we present analysis on various alternative measures of equity for hypothetical 
workers who had been working for 30 years but differing only in the year of appointment. 
Main measures are net benefits (NB), money's worth ratio (MWR) and rate of lifetime 
income gap (RLIG). An NB is defined as a difference between present value of expected 
benefits and present value of expected contribution. An MWR is defined as the ratio of 
present value of expected benefits to the present value of expected contribution for an 
individual or a group.
19  A RLIG is defined as the ratio of lifetime income gap between 
public sector worker and private sector worker relative to p rivate sector worker's lifetime 
income, summarizing the degree of public sector's domination over private sector from 
lifetime income perspective. 
Table 8 provides the estimates of individual equity effects of the 2009 reform. For a 
worker appointed in 1990, the contribution increases by 8.94 percent, the total benefits 
deceases  by  5.97  percent  and  the  net  benefits  falls  by  10.53  percent.  For  a  worker 
appointed in 2009, the contribution increases by 25.53 percent, the total benefits deceases 
by 7.22 percent and the net benefits falls by 19.84 percent. For a worker appointed in 2010 
(a newly appointed worker), the contribution increases by 26.03 percent, the total benefits 
deceases  by  25.43  percent  and  the  net  benefits  falls  by  45.39  percent.  The  simulation 
shows substantial increase in the reduction of NB from the earlier appointed worker to the 
later appointed worker (10.53 percent in 1990, 15.75 percent in 2000, 19.84 percent in 
2009, and 45.39 percent in 2010). While the MWRs in the previous law are almost the 
same over the entire cohorts, the estimate in the present law decreases to 3.7 in 1990, 3.3 
in 2000, 2.8 in 2009, and 2.3 in 2010 with the level of the fall being greater from the earlier 
appointee  to the  later  appointee (13.95  percent  in  1990,  23.26  percent  in  2000,  26.32 
percent in 2009, and 43.90 percent in 2010). Every simulation implies that the resulting 
benefits  loss  becomes  greater  for  a  subsequent  appointee.  More  in  particular,  the 
difference between the 2009 ensured and the 2010 ensured turns out to be strikingly great. 
                                            
19  Money's worth ratio represents an attempt to answer the question: How large are scheduled future benefits 
for a group of workers and their dependents in comparison to (i.e., as a ratio to, or divided by) the amount 
that would be payable using their expected payroll tax contributions invested at a given interest rate or set of 
interest  rates?  In  other  words,  would  the  particular  individual  or  group  get  its  "money's  worth"?  (Orlo 
Nichols, Michael Clingman, Kyle Burkhalter, Alice Wade, and Chris Chaplain b).   17 
This is because the MRA was set at dual basis; for the incumbents the previous term (60 
years old or at the time of normal retirement) was maintained and for the newly appointed 
the  age  was  set  at  65.  For  instance,  a  worker  ensured  a  year  before  the  reform  will 
experience the reduction of net benefits by one fifth while a newly appointee  will see 
reduction by almost a half. 
 
<Table 8> Comparison of Equity Estimates by Year of Appointment (30 Years Service) 





Before the Reform 
(a) 





(10 yrs service   
after reform) 
Contribution(a)*  147,190   160,341   8.94% 
Pension Benefits(b)  628,354   590,867   -5.97% 
Lump-sum Benefits(c)  60,678   60,678   0.00% 
Total Benefits(d=b+c)  689,092   651,545   -5.45% 
Net Benefits(d-a)  481,164   430,526   -10.53% 
MWR(d/a)  4.3  3.7  -13.95% 
2000 
(20 yrs service 
after reform) 
Contribution(a)*  144,053   171,128   18.80% 
Pension Benefits(b)  619,252   571,507   -7.71% 
Lump-sum Benefits(c)  61,772   61,772   0.00% 
Total Benefits(d=b+c)  681,024   633,279   -7.01% 
Net Benefits(d-a)  475,199   400,379   -15.75 
MWR(d/a)  4.3  3.3  -23.26% 
2009 
(29 yrs service 
  after reform) 
Contribution(a)*  143,923  180,667    25.53% 
Pension Benefits(b)  552,106    507,858  -8.01% 
Lump-sum Benefits(c)  60,846    60,846    0.00% 
Total Benefits(d=b+c)  612,952  568,704    -7.22% 
Net Benefits(d-a)  408,183   327,191    -19.84% 




Contribution(a)*  143,888    181,345    26.03% 
Pension Benefits(b)  592,006    426,062    -28.03% 
Lump-sum Benefits(c)  60,674     60,674    0.00% 
Total Benefits(d=b+c)  652,680    486,736    -25.43% 
Net Benefits(d-a)  448,118    244,717    -45.39%   18 
MWR(d/a)  4.1  2.3  -43.90% 
 
[Figure 5] Comparison of the Net Benefits by Year of Appointment 
(with 30 Years of Service)   
  (Present value as of January 2010, thousand Won)   
 
Note: NB is defined as a difference between present value of expected benefits and present value 
of expected contribution. 
 
[Figure 6] Comparison of the MWRs by Year of Employment 
(with 30 Years of Service)   
 
Note: MWR is defined as the ratio of present value of expected benefits to the present value of 
expected contribution. 
 
The equity between public and private employees could serve as important evaluation 
criteria for the reform of the GEPS. However, the GEPS has a mixture of characteristics 
of  basic  and retirement pensions  without  a  clear distinction between the  two  systems, 
which  makes  it  difficult  to  evaluate  the  pension  equity  between  public  and  private 
employees, simply based on the gap in pension benefits. There would be limitations even 
for a simple comparison between the two groups regardless of a wage gap between public 
and  private  employees  and  certain  conditions  of  government  employment,  such  as   19 
guaranteed  status  and  restrictions  on  asset management. Then,  denying  an  institutional 
comparison itself for the reason of occupational characteristics of public service could even 
derail a reform process. In this regard, a discussion on the pension equity between public 
and  private  employees  needs  to  first  define  the  concept  of  'equity,'  reflecting  both 
institutional  equity  and  occupational  characteristics  of  public  service.  This  would  help 
compare the substantial equity between public and private employees, and based on the 
comparison,  it  would  be  meaningful  to  discuss  ways  to  properly  reflect  some  of  the 
occupational characteristics of public service in a pension reform. Under this context, we 
show a quantitative evaluation on the equity gap of retirement income between public and 
private employees. 
Rate of lifetime income gap (RLIG) for the newly appointed, expressed as the ratio of 
lifetime income gap relative to private sector's lifetime, is presented in Table 9 and Figure 7. 
The lifetime income gap between the public sector and private sector was 146.8 million 
won and, after the reform, it was reduced to - 37.4 million won. As a result, the RLIG was 
reduced from 8.5 percent in the absence of the reform to – 2.2 percent, reflecting that the 
equity between public sector worker and private sector worker is substantially improved. 
 
<Table 9> Comparison of Lifetime Income Gap between Private and Public Sector   
(Newly Appointed Worker with 30 Years of Service)   
(Present value as of January 2010, thousand Won) 
Equity Measures 









contribution(a)  143,888    109,549     181,345    109,549   
pension benefits(b)  592,006    156,697    426,062    156,697   
lump-sum benefits(c)  60,674    174,405    60,674    17,4405    
wage income(d)  1,302,117    1,459,772    1,302,117    1,459,772    
lifetime income 
(e=b+c+d-a/2) 
1,882,853    1,736,099     1,698,717   
1,736,099  
 
lifetime income gap 
(f=e(public)-e(private)) 
146,754    -37,382   
RLIG 
(f/e(private)*100) 
8.5  -2.2%   20 
 
[Figure 7] Comparison of RLIG between Private Sector and Public Sector   
(Case of a Newly Appointed Worker with 30 Years of Service)   
 
Note: RLIG is defined as the ratio of lifetime income gap between public sector worker and 
private sector worker relative to private sector worker's lifetime income 
 
  Box: Summing-up Evaluation 
First, from a financial perspective, the future pension cost will significantly decrease, improving 
the financing of the future GEPS. In short, the burden of the future government would be 
reduced by more than 50 percent. However, the significance of the financial improvement 
must be kept in proper perspective. It should be noted that financial gain until 2030 will turn 
out  to  be  relatively  small  and  the  future  government  will  still  be  required  to  subsidize  a 
considerable sum of money for the system.   
Second, from an equity perspective, the net benefits (NB) of the newly ensured will be reduced 
by almost 45 percent and the money's worth ratio will fall to 2.3 from 4.1, implying that the 
group  would get  significantly  less  money's  worth.  And,  the  RLIG  for  the  newly  ensured, 
expressed  as  the  ratio  of  lifetime  income  gap  relative  to  private  sector's  lifetime,  will  be 
reduced  from 8.5  percent  to  -2.2  percent,  reflecting  that  the  equity  between  public  sector 
worker and private sector worker is substantially improved as well. However, this result must 
also be kept in proper perspective. The benefits loss is relatively small for the incumbent and, 
more in particular, the difference between a 2009 ensured worker (as incumbent cohort) and a 
2010 ensured worker (as newly ensured cohort) turns out to be strikingly great.   
Third, although the 2009 reform will bring about significant impact on both financial status 
and equity aspect, it is essentially about parametric change where the pension structure was set at 
dual basis, particularly to the MRA. This is ultimately because the reform was intended to be a 
compromise between the incumbent workers and the general public group, for the sacrifice of 
the benefits of the newly ensured.1  In overall, we recognize that the 2009 reform is a typical 
example of the so-called 'compromise among interest groups' and 'give and take' of politics 
(Overbye 2008).     21 
4.  Policy Implications and Tasks ahead 
 
Regrettably, the GEPS had overlooked, for over 50 years, the importance of financial 
management to balance the system actuarially. In other words, the pension benefit have 
been adjusted upward over several times depending on the changes in the political and 
social  conditions,  whereas  no  corresponding  measures  have  been  developed  to  raise 
financial resources to keep up with the upward benefit adjustment. The importance of the 
management of  pension  funds  was  not  fully  recognized  until  the mid-1990s  when  the 
pension  deficit became  large  and  persistent, but the  realization  was  already  too  late  to 
reverse the ongoing trend. The size of pension debts, which has grown quietly but steadily 
for  the  past  30  years,  was  too  large  to  restore  a  fiscal  balance  through  a  marginal 
adjustment  of  premium  or  pension  benefit  levels.  Later,  the  Korean  government  had 
implemented  parametric  adjustment,  including  a  series  of  premium  increase  and  the 
adjustment of pension benefits and eligibility age, but they were not enough to recover the 
funds which were actually almost depleted. This left the GEPS with no choice but to 
depend on support from the government's general account to cover its deficit. After all, the 
GEPS  has  not  yet  achieved  its  sustainability  despite  the  recent  premium  increase  and 
system reform, which therefore highlights the need for a long-term financial stabilization 
measure as soon as possible in order to enhance the sustainability. To that end, this study 
suggests following measures for system improvement.   
First, one of the most imminent challenges is to streamline the system in order to 
achieve an actuarial balance in the  system. The structural imbalance of the system has 
accumulated a huge amount of implicit pension debts, and as long as the current system is 
left unchecked, the debts will invariably continue to rise fast. Let alone legacy debts from 
the  past,  immediate  actions  are  required  to  streamline  the  system,  at  least,  to  prevent 
additional debts in the future. To make this happen, there should be reconsideration on the 
adequacy of the current pension benefit level, and more importantly, it is necessary to 
establish a framework to raise financial resources based on the principle of an actuarial 
balance, not an improvised measure only to cover the deficit as can be seen today.   
Second, the current premium pricing  method, under which the government and an 
individual  government  employee  equally  share  the  premium,  needs  to  be  transformed 
focusing more on the role of the government as an employer. From the perspective of the 
employees  in  the  private  sector,  the  GEPS  is  a  system  which  combines  the  National 
Pension  and  the  Occupational  Retirement  Pension  (or  retirement  allowances).  The 
employer in the private sector covers approximately 13 percent of the premium which 
includes a half (4.5 percent) of the National Pension and full retirement allowances (8.3   22 
percent). On the other hand, the government, as the employer of government employees 
and as the provider of the system, has only covered less than a half of 13 percent. In this 
way, the government has remained passive in playing the role as an employer, leading to 
worsening financial imbalance of the system. This needs to be corrected immediately, and 
furthermore,  an  adequate  role  of  the  government  as  an  employer  should  be  clearly 
stipulated again in the law. In short, the government needs to expand its full coverage of 
the GEPS to  what  is  considered  most  appropriate  retirement  allowance  in the private 
sector.  It  is  also  necessary  to  provide  additional  financial  support  to  compensatory 
temporary lump-sum allowances which are not related to the pension benefits. Also, the 
government  should  be  held  accountable  for  the  unfunded  pension  debts  due  to  its 
insufficient contribution in the past.   
Third, with the 2009 reform, the future public sector will be distinctively characterized 
by two groups of working population with different levels of pension benefits; one is 
appointed before the 2009 reform and the other after the reform. Here, the difference may 
cause  various  problems  such  as  generational  conflict  within  the  public  sector  and 
inefficient personnel management  for the  government.  Although the  2009  reform  will 
consolidate the long-term financial situation of the system by and large, the GEPS will 
inevitably face intra-generational equity conflicts. In addition, the government may find it 
extremely  difficult  to  recruit  and  retain  competitive  employees.  The  necessary  soothing 
mechanism should be implemented in a timely and appropriate manner so that the equity 
conflict and inefficient personnel management can be minimized. Following the reform 
trend of the civil servant pension systems around the world, the implementation of top up 
DC scheme for the newly appointed could be an effective alternative. Most of all, the 
future path of the GEPS reform should be chosen in a fashion that both macro-financial 
aspect and micro-equity aspect are equally well considered. 
Forth, the pension benefits, including the retirement allowance, for the government 
employees is over 1.5 times the sum of the incomes from the National Pension and the 
statutory retirement allowance for private employees. Other aspects of the GEPS, such as 
pension  eligibility  age,  indexation  method,  and  accrual  rate  of  survivor's  pension  are 
designed in favor of government employees, compared with ones for the National Pension. 
It is not impossible to understand that, compared to retirement allowance for workers in 
the  private  sector,  the  pension  for  government  employees  needs  to  be  generous 
considering their low wage and occupational characteristics of public service, but excessive 
disparity may trigger equity problems especially for the current employees. Furthermore, 
given that the benefit level of the National Pension was recently reduced by a large amount 
and that the government will soon increase tax support to cover the deficit of the GEPS,   23 
the  public's  discontent  against  the  system  will  grow  further,  and  therefore  additional 
adjustment on the benefit level for the current employees should be considered.    
Lastly, in order to enhance the financial sustainability of the GEPS, there should be 
more  bold  structural  reforms  to  the  current  system.  It  may  be  necessary  to  consider 
measures to transform the current singular system into a multi-tiered system including a 
basic state pension, which corresponds to the National Pension, and into a high-tiered 
pension, which corresponds to a private retirement pension and individual annuity plan. 
(See Appendix for more details) In this case of adjustment, it would be much easier to 
identify a functional distinction on the role of the GEPS and to decide on whom to blame 
for  financing  if  it runs  into trouble.  Also,  it  is necessary to  consider  prospectively  the 
operation measure of integrating the one-tiered National Pension, as in the reform cases in 
the US and Japan, while separately managing the function of the private retirement pension 
from the GEPS. 
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  Appendix: KDI's Recommendation on the Reform of the GEPS 
 
As the GEPS is expected to record a deficit of over one trillion won, the Ministry of 
Public  Administration  and  Security  (then  Ministry  of  Government  Administration  and 
Home Affairs) requested the Korea Development Institute (KDI) in May 2006 to conduct a 
commissioned study on the fiscal stabilization and system improvement of the GEPS. Later 
that year in October, the KDI submitted the structural reform measures for the pension to 
the Ministry. KDI suggestion targeted a long-term fiscal stabilization of the GEPS and the 
improvement of the equity between systems and generations within the scope that does not 
exceed the adequacy of the pension income level. Based on this, KDI suggested a structural 
reform of transforming the current single-tiered system into a multi-tiered system.    
The basic object of the structural reform plan by KDI is to obtain an equity in the 
system by making newly hired government employees since 2009 subscribe to the National 
Pension and also raising the current retirement benefit of the GEPS to the level of the 
statutory retirement allowances in the private sector, so as to obtain an institutional equity 
between public and private employees. In addition, considering occupational characteristics 
of public service, such as the relative wage gap and restrictions on asset management, KDI 
suggestion also includes a three-tiered voluntary defined contribution (DC) savings account 
system  with  a  government's  matching  subsidy  so  as  to  improve  a  substantial,  not 
institutional, equity between public and private employees.     
On the other hand, as for incumbent government employees, KDI suggests a measure 
to  transform  the  current  GEPS  work  consistent  with  the  National  Pension  through 
parametric adjustment and institutional changes on the income and premium level, instead 
of switching over to the National Pension. They are as well entitled to the expansion of 
retirement allowance and its annuitization, and the new savings account system as to the 
newly  hired  government  employees.  To  that  end,  KDI  suggestions  include  institutional 
improvement measures, such as adjusting the annuity formula and premium rate, changing 
the  criteria  for  income  calculation  and  indexation  method  of  pensions,  readjusting  the 
maximum and minimum contribution periods and the pension eligibility age, and creating or 
adjusting disability and survivors' pensions. Through these institutional improvements, the 
total retirement income benefits for the incumbent government employees is steered to 
decrease  gradually  by  grandfathering  (which  applies  the  existing  system  to  the  past 
employment period) toward the level equal to the benefit level for newly hired government 
employees  who  started to  work  2009.  Theses  suggestions  are displayed  in  a  conceptual 
diagram of Figure 1.   
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[Figure A] Conceptual Framework of KDI’s Reform Proposal in 2007   
 
Source: Moon, et.al.(2006) 
 
KDI's suggestions are to phase out the imbalanced current structure and transform it 
into a multi-tired structure which is linked to the National Pension.
2) The long-term financial 
effect of this institutional reform is shown in Figure-2. As shown in the figure, the fiscal 
burden tends to increase during the initial stage of transformation due to the newly hired 
government employees switching to the National Pension and the new funds of savings 
account, but in the long term, the financial burden in the share of GDP is expected to 
decrease continuously towards a fiscal stabilization. In particular, the share of fiscal burden 
in 2070 is expected to fall below the half of that in the current system and this gap is 
forecast to widen further afterwards. 
 










2007 2017 2027 2037 2047 2057 2067
current system Funded retirement pension 2) Unfunded  retirement pension 3)  28 
 Note: 1) The total government burden is the ratio in the share of GDP, added by the government burden 
ratio, the retirement pension premium, and the matching contribution of savings account.   
 2) In the case of operating the two-tiered retirement pension in the way of full funding  
 3) In the case of operating the two-tiered retirement pension in the way of terminal funding.  
 Source: Moon et al. (2006).   
 
Moreover, KDI's suggestions have several institutional strengths. First, they make a clear 
distinction between institutional equity and occupational characteristics of public service in 
the aspect of the equity between public and private employees, reflecting the distinction into 
the system in a more transparent way and thereby discarding any room for preferential 
favors for the GEPS under the existing system. In other words, the one-tiered National 
Pension and the two-tiered retirement pension are designed and applied in the same way, 
while  the  three-tiered  savings  account  system  is  created  to  make  up  for  invariable 
restrictions on the status as a government employee, contributing to the improvement of 
substantial  equity.  Second,  a  multi-tiered  system  could  make  it  clear  of  the  premium 
payment criteria to be applied to the government and public employees. In other words, it is 
suggested that the premium for the one-tiered National Pension is equally shared by the 
government and public employees, the premium for the two-tiered retirement pension is 
solely paid by the government as an employer in the private sector, and the premium for the 
three-tiered savings account adopts a principle of voluntary participation by allowing the 
right to decide how much to fund and where to invest.    
 